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WiFi Security Types

Open

  • Authentication: None
  • Cipher: None

Vulnerabilities

  • Passive Sniffing
  • MITM/evil-twin
  • Captive Portal Trust
  • MAC Spoofing

WEP

  • Authentication: Shared key
  • Cipher: RC4

Vulnerabilities

  • IV reuse
  • Replay/injection
  • Cracking (trivial)

WPA

  • Authentication: PSK
  • Cipher: TKIP/RC4

Vulnerabilities

  • TKIP
  • Cracking (passphrase complexity dependent)
  • WPS exposure

WPA2-Personal (PSK)

  • Authentication: PSK (4-way handshake)
  • Cipher: CCMP/AES (avoid TKIP/mixed modes)

Vulnerabilities

  • Offline bruteforce
    • Captured 4-way handshake or PMKID when PSK is weak.
  • WPS PIN brute-force/"Pixie Dust" if enabled.
  • Deauth/disassoc spoofing when PMF is disabled.
  • KRACK/key-reinstallation on unpatched clients/APs

WPA2-Enterprise

  • Authentication: 802.1X/EAP (e.g., PEAP-MSCHAPv2, EAP-TTLS, prefer EAP-TLS)
  • Cipher: CCMP/AES

Vulnerabilities

  • Evil-twin (no server certificate validation)
  • Offline bruteforce user passwords (PEAP-MSCHAPv2 challenge capture)
  • User enumeration via non-anonymous outer identity.
  • Deauth/disassoc spoofing when PMF is disabled.
  • KRACK/key-reinstallation on unpatched clients/APs.
  • Weak/expired RADIUS certificates or poor PKI practices.
  • Roaming features (11r/k/v) misconfigurations enabling downgrade/steering abuse.

WPA3-Personal (SAE)

  • Authentication: SAE (dragonfly PAKE)
  • Cipher: CCMP-128/GCMP-128

Vulnerabilities

  • WPA2/WPA3 transition mode downgrade unless Transition Disable is enforced.
  • Early Dragonblood-class side channels in unpatched stacks.
  • Weak passphrases still allow online/side-channel guessing attempts (though offline is resisted).
  • PMF policy gaps on legacy bands can re-enable deauth/disassoc vectors.

WPA3-Enterprise (128-bit)

  • Authentication: 802.1X/EAP (typically EAP-TLS)
  • Cipher: CCMP-128/GCMP-128

Vulnerabilities

  • Same EAP/certificate pitfalls as WPA2-Enterprise (no server-cert validation, weak inner methods).
  • Downgrade risk if WPA2 is permitted in mixed deployments; prefer WPA3-only where feasible.
  • Operational misconfigurations: PMF enforcement gaps, certificate lifecycle/validation errors.
  • Client compatibility gaps leading to fallback SSIDs with weaker settings.